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ADVANCING THE CULTURE OF LIFE
THROUGH FAITHFUL CITIZENSHIP
TERESA STANTON COLLETT*
One of the fundamental questions that people of faith confront is how
to describe our condition. Are we Catholics who are citizens of America,
or are we Americans who are members of the Catholic Church? While this
may seem to be mere semantics, the ordering of the question contains a
subtle, but important, revelation of priorities. Both formulations presume
the compatibility of religious and national identity. The first question
assumes our essential identity arises from our relationship with Christ
through His Church, while the second assumes our foremost loyalty lies
with our nation. The effect of this ordering on the actual political positions
of any individual is unclear,' and the legitimacy of public assumptions
. Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis, MN). The author
served as Counsel of Record on the amicus brief filed by the Christian Medical & Dental
Association in Stenberg v. Carhart, and Gonzales v. Carhart, as well as counsel of record on the
amicus briefs filed by the New Hampshire legislatures and the governors of Minnesota and North
Dakota in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.
1. This is due in part to the individualistic theology embraced by many Americans.
"Americans do, however, take a very independent approach to religion. Their faith must make
sense to them, and it must reflect the values of freedom that they assume in their daily social and
political lives." GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN
FAITH IN THE 90'S 90 (MacMillan Publishing Company 1989). While religious affiliation in the
contemporary United States is largely voluntary, affiliation with any particular religious
community does not equal personal acceptance of any particular tenet or teaching of that
community. The United States Supreme Court, recognizing this difficulty, commented:
The church's jurisdiction [over members] exists as a result of the mutual agreement
between that body and its member. "All who unite themselves to such a body do so
with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it." That
relationship may be severed freely by a member's positive act at any time.
Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 987 (Okla. 1992) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 729 (1872)). Cf Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 527 F. Supp. 632, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
("Membership or affiliation [with the American Jewish Congress] is not equivalent to agreement
with the positions the organization's governing body may choose to take.").
This is true, in part, because of the American emphasis on the supremacy of individual
conscience. The danger of over-extending this view of human conscience is described by Pope
John Paul II:
The individual conscience is accorded the status of a supreme tribunal of moraljudgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about good and evil.
To the affirmation that one has a duty to follow one's conscience is unduly added the
affirmation that one's moral judgment is true merely by the fact that it has its origin in
the conscience. But in this way the inescapable claims of truth disappear, yielding their
place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity and "being at peace with oneself," so much
so that some have come to adopt a radically subjectivistic conception of moral
judgment.
Pope John Paul It, The Splendor of Truth (Veritatis Splendor) § 48-49 (August 8,1993), available
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based upon that ordering is deeply contested. 2 Nonetheless, it is clear that
the prioritizing of religious and political identity will influence a person's
process of decision making and ultimately his or her decisions. This article
is addressed to those who understand human nature in a way that is
consistent with the teachings of the Catholic faith and give primacy to that
understanding over the ideas embedded in much of contemporary American
political culture.
This article provides a brief summary of the principles that should
guide Catholics in their political decision making and illustrates the
application of those principles to our obligation to build a culture of life
within a civilization of love. The first section of this article discusses
human nature and the obligation to do good and avoid evil. The concepts
of freedom, truth, good and evil are defined and their connections briefly
discussed. Section two of the article introduces Catholic political theory
regarding the citizen's right and duty to participate in democracy and the
limited role of the state in advancing the good of the human person and the
at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jpii-enc_0 6 0 8 1993_
veritatis-splendoren.html (last visited June 5, 2008).
It is compounded by the absence of any concept of magisterial authority in most religious sects,
and the weak understanding of and adherence to the teachings on the magisterial authority by
members of sects having such a doctrine. For example, the teachings of the Roman Catholic
Church contain the concept of magisterial authority.
The law of God entrusted to the Church is taught to the faithful as the way of life and
truth. The faithful therefore have the right to be instructed in the divine saving precepts
that purify judgment and, with grace, heal wounded human reason. They have the duty
of observing the constitutions and decrees conveyed by the legitimate authority of the
Church. Even if they concern disciplinary matters, these determinations call for docility
in charity.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2037 (2d. ed. 1997), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM (last visited June 5, 2008). Nonetheless,
surveys of American Catholics indicate wide disagreement with Catholic teachings on many
issues including the insolubility of marriage, the limitations on the use of birth control, etc. See
e.g. Lynda Sadd, Cultural Tolerance for Divorce Grows to 70%, GALLUP, May 18, 2008,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/I07380/Cultural-Tolerance-Divorce-Grows-70.aspx (reporting that
75% of Catholics believe that divorce is "morally acceptable"); Mark M. Gray, Paul M. Perl, and
Tricia C. Bruce, Marriage in the Catholic Church: A Survey of U.S. Catholics 55, Oct. 2007,
http://cara.georgetown.edu/MarriageReport.pdf (reporting that 76% of Catholics believe that
divorce is acceptable in some cases); David W. Moore, American Catholics Revere Pope,
Disagree with Some Major Teachings, GALLUP, April 4, 2005,
http://www.gallup.com/polll 5478/Amefican-Catholics-Revere-Pope-Disagree-Some-Major-
Teachings.aspx (reporting that 78% of surveyed Catholics believe that the next pope should
"allow Catholics to use birth control").
2. Consider the debate surrounding the presidential candidacy of John F. Kennedy, which
led him to address his faith in a public speech:
I am not the Catholic candidate for President. I am the Democratic Party's
candidate for President who happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church
on public matters--and the church does not speak for me.
Whatever issue may come before me as President-on birth control, divorce, censorship,
gambling or any other subject-I will make my decision in accordance with these views,
in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the national interest, and without
regard to outside religious pressures or dictates. And no power or threat of punishment
could cause me to decide otherwise.
John F. Kennedy, Jr., Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association (Sept. 12, 1960),
available at http://www.ameficanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkhoustonministers.html (last visited
June 5, 2008).
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human community. Section Three provides a sketch of American
constitutional law regarding life issues. Section Four disputes the claim
advanced by some Catholics that a candidate's views on abortion is
irrelevant because ordinary citizens can not influence an issue that the
courts have declared to be a matter of constitutional law.3 The article
concludes with an examination of the potential impact of faithful citizens in
building a culture of life through involvement in national and state politics.
I. HUMAN NATURE AND THE OBLIGATION TO Do GOOD
AND AVOID EVIL
Scripture teaches that the human person is made in the image of God
and for communion with God and other persons.4 Because this is our
nature, the primary relationship in every person's life is his or her
relationship with God.' This is true, whether the person acknowledges God
and willingly participates in relationship with him, or denies God and
rejects his friendship. The capacity to accept or reject God's friendship is
an integral part of our created nature,6 evidencing God's desire that we
come to him freely as children, and not as slaves.7 The eternal drama of
3. "Senator Obama's emphasis on personal responsibility, rather than legal bickering over
potential Supreme Court nominations in my judgment, best moves this issue forward." Doug
Kmeic, Doug Kmeic Reaffirms Endorsing Obama, Catholic Online (May 3, 2008),
http://www.catholic.org/politics/story.php?id=27820&wf-rsscol (last visited June 5, 2008). See
also Penny Starr, Catholic Senator Says Pro-Abortion Obama's Okay with Him (Apr. 16, 2008),
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?Page=/Politics/archive/200804/POL20080416a.html.
I think it's possible in the next term of the president that they will directly or indirectly
confront the issue of abortion, but they may not," Casey said. "But I'm certain that they
will confront the issues - what are we going to do about the war, what about a $10
trillion debt, what about health care, the recession?
Id. (quoting U.S. Senator Robert Casey, Jr.); Cf David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz,
Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809 (2006) (suggesting similar
conclusion is required for Evangelical Christians).
4. Genesis 1:26-27.
God, infinitely perfect and blessed in himself, in a plan of sheer goodness freely created
man to make him share in his own blessed life. For this reason, at every time and in
every place, God draws close to man. He calls him to seek him, to know him, to love
him with all his strength.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 1, at § 1.
5. "In fact, the individual's relation to God is the constitutive element of the very 'being'
and 'existence' of an individual: it is in God that we 'live, move and have our being' (quoting
Acts 17:28)." John Paul II, The Lay Members of Christ's Faithful People, § 39 (December 30,
1988), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-fatherljohn.paul-ii/apost-exhortations/documents/hfjpii exh_30121
988_christifideles-laicien.html (last visited June 5, 2008).
6. Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World
(Gaudium et Spes), (December 7, 1965), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/iivaticancouncil/documents/vatii-cons_19651207
gaudium-et-spes-en.html (last visited June 5, 2008).
7. "All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. You did not receive a spirit of
slavery leading you back into fear, but a spirit of adoption through which we cry out, 'Abba!' [that
is, "Father"]. The Spirit himself gives witness with our spirit that we are children of God. But if
we are children, we are heirs as well: heirs of God, heirs with Christ, if only we suffer with him so
as to be glorified with him." Romans 8:14-17; see also Galatians 4:1-7 (stating that followers of
No. 1] Advancing the Culture of Life Through Faithful Citizenship 23
human history is defined by our individual and collective decisions to draw
near to God and thus fulfill our human nature or withdraw from God, often
in an attempt to define our own destiny. By choosing to draw near to God
we are following the basic moral precept, "do good and avoid evil."8
This precept, however, is a contested norm in contemporary society,
because of an unwillingness to acknowledge that objective standards of
good and evil exist.9 Few people would embrace the idea that a person
should "do evil and avoid good," but many argue that only the individual
can determine what is good and what is evil. This is an ancient error as
evidenced by the conversation between Eve and the serpent in the Garden
of Eden. "[Y]ou will be like gods who know what is good and what is
bad."'" Some secularist philosophies go beyond this to argue, "you will be
like gods who decide what is good and what is bad."" Absent objective
standards for good and evil, decisions have value only to the degree that
they represent authentic expressions of the person's will. 2
Three justices of the United States Supreme Court expressed this
understanding of human nature in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 "At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."' 4  Thus, the person comes into
being only through the processes of choosing, and freedom becomes the
primary object of public morality.
This is a distorted understanding of public morality. Freedom is
valuable, but its value does not lie in the "freedom to make any choice."' 5
It lies in the freedom to make good choices; to fully appropriate into one's
being the value of goodness and to participate in the creation of future
possibilities of goodness. "The more one does what is good, the freer one
God's law are His sons and heirs); John 1:12-13
8. Second Vatican Council, supra note 7, at § 16. "Depart from evil and do good; seek
peace and pursue it." Psalms 34:13.
9. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on Some Questions
regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life, § 2 (November 21, 2002), available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc-con-cfaith-doc2002112
4_politicaen.html (last visited June 5, 2008).
10. Genesis 3:5.
11. See e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
Random House 1966).
12. When nothing beyond the individual is recognized as definitive, the ultimate criterion of
judgment becomes the self and the satisfaction of the individual's immediate wishes. The
objectivity and perspective, which can only come through recognition of the essential
transcendent dimension of the human person, can be lost. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to
Catholic Educators (April 17, 2008), http://www.zenit.org/rssenglish-22328 (last visited June 5,
2008).
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. Id. at 851.
15. "Only in freedom can man direct himself toward goodness. Our contemporaries make
much of this freedom and pursue it eagerly; and rightly to be sure. Often however they foster it
perversely as a license for doing whatever pleases them, even if it is evil." Second Vatican
Council, supra note 7, at § 17.
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becomes. There is no true freedom except in the service of what is good
and just. The choice to disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and
leads to 'the slavery of sin."' 16 Freedom, then, must be directed to the
good, or it degenerates into license which harms both the person and the
community. 17
But if freedom must be directed to the good, how do we know what is
good and what is evil? Good and evil are not subjective constructs that
merely reflect the desires or appetites of the individual. 8 The good is that
which leads to human flourishing; evil is that which diminishes human
flourishing. In coming to know God through Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit,
the Scriptures and the traditions of the faith, the Christian comes to know
good from evil.' 9 Good reflects our embrace of God and the fullness of
life. 20
II. POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND PURSUIT OF THE GOOD
Participation in the political process is one of the means by which
Catholics pursue both the good of the person and the common good. The
"common good embraces the sum of those conditions of the social life
whereby men, families and associations more adequately and readily may
attain their own perfection."' 21 The common good is not the aggregation of
individual goods, but rather the right ordering of society.22
As citizens living in a democratic republic, Americans have both the
right and the duty to promote the common good by directing the
16. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 1, at § 1733); see also Galatians
5:13 ("My brothers, remember that you have been called to live in freedom-but not a freedom that
gives free reign to the flesh. Out of love, place yourselves at one another's service.").
17. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Secretariat for Doctrine and Pastoral Practices,
Doctrinal Note on Some Questions regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life: A
Synopsis, § IV.7 (2002), http://www.usccb.org/dpp/synopsis.htm (last visited June 5, 2008)
("[flreedom without truth is license and destructive of society."); Second Vatican Council, supra
note 7, at § 17 ("For its part, authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image within
man. For God has willed that man remain 'under the control of his own decisions,' so that he can
seek his Creator spontaneously, and come freely to utter and blissful perfection through loyalty to
Him.").
18. "Revelation teaches that 'the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not
belong to man, but to God alone."' Pope John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, supra note 1, at §
35. Jesus makes this clear in his response to the rich young man who seeks his counsel: "Why do
you call me good? No one is good, but God alone." Matthew 19:19.
19. GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, FULFILLMENT IN CHRIST: A SUMMARY OF
CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 49-51 (University of Notre Dame Press 1991) (defining good and
bad as follows: "The Christian tradition has developed a better account of the bad. Badness is real,
not illusory. It is a real absence in things of what ought to be.... To be good is for something to be
fully, to be all it should be--no lacks, no privations."); Id. at 80 (defining the morally good: "In
voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose
and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will
toward integral human fulfillment.").
20. "I came that they might have life and have it abundantly." John 10:10.
21. Second Vatican Council, supra note 7, at § 74.
22. Id.
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government's policies. 23  This is done primarily by voting and
communicating with public officials.
Indeed, all can contribute, by voting in elections for lawmakers and
government officials, and in other ways as well, to the development of
political solutions and legislative choices, which, in their opinion, will
benefit the common good. The life of a democracy could not be productive
without the active, responsible and generous involvement of everyone,
albeit in a diversity and complementarity of forms, levels, tasks, and
responsibilities. 24 As observed by the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, "... responsible citizenship is a virtue, and participation in
political life is a moral obligation. 25
In making political judgments, citizens properly adhere to their
understanding of human nature, of what constitutes good and evil, and the
role of government in realizing various goods and combating assorted evils.
"[P]olitics are concerned with very concrete realizations of the true human
and social good in given historical, geographical, economic, technological
and cultural contexts. 2 6
Knowledge of good and evil, combined with a right understanding of
freedom, does not answer the question of the state's role in encouraging
people to seek the good. It is often assumed that belief in the capacity to
know good from evil necessarily results in a belief that the state must
require goodness of its citizens, but this is not so.
It is widely held that the inner logic of such an affirmation [of a
substantive concept of the human good derived from our
understanding of God and his plan for humanity] tends inexorably
toward policy authoritarianism, and thus that such an affirmation
necessarily constitutes some kind of incipient fascism. . . . Yet,
although widely asserted, the truth of this claim is by no means
self-evident. From the premise that we can know the human good it
does not automatically follow that it is the right-much less the
duty-of government to compel all to embrace it. If some
substantive conceptions of the good life may foster an authoritarian
politics, others may foster a commitment to government that is
sharply limited in its scope and responsible to those it governs.27
There are many human goods that are beyond the capacity of
government to provide- friendship and love are clear examples-and it
would be useless, if not dangerous, for government to attempt to provide
such goods. But while government can not provide friendship or love, it
23. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Forming Consciences for Faithful
Citizenship: A Call to Political Responsibility from the Catholic Bishops of the United States, 13
(November 14, 2007), available at http://www.usccb.org/faithfulcitizenship/FCStatement.pdf (last
visited June 5, 2008).
24. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, supra note 10.
25. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 24, at 13.
26. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, supra note 10, at § 3.
27. Kenneth L. Grasso, Beyond Liberalism, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, &
COMMUNITARIANISM 53, 54 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995).
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can encourage or discourage the attainment of these goods. Laws requiring
strict segregation of the races clearly impeded the ability of persons of
different races to enter into friendships, 28 and contemporary divorce laws
allowing unilateral dissolution of marriage have diminished the ability of
married couples to persevere in their vows of lifelong love and fidelity. 9
It is equally important to note that all evils can not be eradicated by
government. As Thomas Aquinas observed:
Human law is imposed on the multitude, a part of which is
composed of men imperfect in virtue. Thus all the vices from which
the virtuous abstain are not punished by human law, but only the
more grievous ones which most people can avoid, and especially
those which can hurt others, without the prohibition of which
human society could not be preserved. Thus homicide, theft and the
like are prohibited by human law."
There are some vices, while harmful to the person engaging in them,
that legal prohibitions are incapable of restraining or that, because of the
means necessary to restrain them, will result in even greater evils. Much of
American free speech jurisprudence is supported by this reasoning. While
it is clear that some speech is hurtful to others or advances foolish or evil
ideas, empowering the government to permanently silence citizens poses
too great a threat to the processes of collective self-governance to outlaw
"bad speech."'"
That said, as Aquinas notes, there are some evils that a just government
must combat. Chief among these is the evil of violence directed at the
innocent. A government that failed to enact or generally enforce laws
against murder would have failed in one of its most fundamental
obligations-stability and security of a just order.32 As Aquinas notes, this
failure would imperil the continuance of the government and society.
Similarly a government is fundamentally flawed if its protections against
28. The novel, HUCKLEBERRY FINN, explores this dilemma in its description of Huck and
Jim's journey down the Mississippi River. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY
FINN 273 (Scholastic Inc. 1990) (1885).
29. Establishing this fact is difficult empirically due to the large number of confounding
factors in each divorce. Experts, however, agree that the adoption of unilateral divorce causes a
significant upsurge in the number of divorces the first ten years after enactment. Compare Norval
Glenn, Further Discussion of the Effects of No-Fault Divorce on Divorce Rates, 61 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 800 (1999), and Ira Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship
Between Divorce Rates and Divorce Laws, 18 INT'L J. ECON. 341 (1998), with Douglas W.
Allen, The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and Divorce, in THE LAW AND ECON. OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 191 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002), and
Rogers et al., Did No-Fault Divorce Legislation Matter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes No, 61 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 803 (1999), and Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise
Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 1802 (2006).
30. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, q. 96, a. 2.
31. See R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (ordinance prohibiting speech which
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others" was unconstitutional and could not form the basis
for punishing the burning of a cross in the yard of a black family); Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Communications Decency
Act prohibiting interet distribution of pornography to children).
32. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 1, at § 1909.
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murder or violence are limited to only a portion of society.33 Yet this is the
state of affairs in America today. This is true, not because it represents the
will of the citizens or their elected representatives, but rather because a tiny,
yet powerful, group of men declared it must be so.
III. JUDICIAL USURPATION OF THE LIFE ISSUE
In 1973, a majority of the United States Supreme Court declared that
the Constitution prohibited extending legal protection to the unborn. The
text of the Constitution and its amendments do not explicitly address the
question of abortion.34 Nor is there a textual "right to privacy," which is the
foundation of the judicially-created right to abortion.35
Yet, in spite of the Constitution's silence on abortion, the Court struck
down the laws of forty-six states protecting the unborn. Equating
interpretations of explicit Constitutional provisions protecting the privacy
of the home and of criminal defendants 36 to the judicially-created right to
use and sell contraception,37 the Roe majority ruled,
[t]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.38
As one prominent scholar of constitutional law has observed, "Roe
simply stringcites a series of privacy cases involving marriage, procreation,
contraception, bedroom reading, education, and other assorted topics, and
33. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (rejected liability arising under
the Constitution for government officials' failure to protect children, even in cases when officials
have notice that the children's lives are threatened).
34. The holding of Roe has generated an extended effort to amend the United States
Constitution to explicitly protect human life. See James Bopp, Jr., An Examination of Proposals
for a Human Life Amendment, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 417, 447 (1986); Francis J. Beckwith,
Disagreement without Debate: the Republican Party Platform and the Human Life Amendment, 4
NEXUS J.OP. 113 (Spr. 1999); Paolo Torzilli, Note, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human Life, the
Declaration ofIndependence, and the Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197 (2000). For an outline
of post-Roe efforts to pass a human life amendment, see National Committee for a Human Life
Amendment, Human Life Amendment at http://www.nchla.org/issues.asp?ID=46.
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right to privacy."); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69
S.CAL. L. REv. 47, 96-96 (1995) (describing the "cavalier treatment of the constitutional text" as
one of the weaknesses in the Roe opinion).
36. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court gave the term "privacy" a central role in the
interpretation of the Third and Fourth Amendment. See e.g., Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350 n. 5
(1967) ("[t]he Third Amendment's prohibition against the unconsented peacetime quartering of
soldiers protects another aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion."); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects areas in which one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy from unreasonable searches and seizures).
37. E.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
38. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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then abruptly announces with no doctrinal analysis that this privacy right 'is
broad enough to encompass' abortion. Ipse dixit."39 The Court's inability to
definitively identify the constitutional text or historical interpretation
requiring it to overturn the abortion laws of forty-six states evidences the
vacuous nature of Roe's analysis.4"
The Court rejected any claim of constitutional status on behalf of the
unborn child as unsupported by the text of the Constitution.4 According to
Justice Blackmun, the Court's differing treatment of constitutional text is
justified because no prior case had held "that a fetus is a person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 He failed to explain how the
absence of this judicial precedent differed from the absence of any Supreme
Court precedent holding that abortion was constitutionally protected. The
justice further opined that a contrary ruling would be inconsistent with the
Texas law, which allowed abortion for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.43
The absence of any prior holding establishing the constitutional
personhood of a fetus is not surprising in light of the state of medical
knowledge during the first 150 years of this nation's constitutional
existence. Yet careful examination of the development of Anglo-American
law prior to Roe evidences ever-increasing attempts to protect the life of the
39. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (1999) (criticizing the
textual reasoning of the majority, but praising Roe's holistic reading of the Constitution).
40. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 697
(Carolina Academic Press 2006).
41. The majority correctly identified the Constitution as addressing the rights of "citizens' or
"persons," but limited those terms to human beings who survive birth.
The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to 'person.' The first, in defining
'citizens,' speaks of 'persons born or naturalized in the United States.' The word also
appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. 'Person' is
used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for
Representatives and Senators, Art, 1, s 2, cl. 2, and s 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment
Clause, Art. I, s 2, cl. 3; in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, s 9, cl. 1; in
the Emoulument Clause, Art, I, s 9, cl. 8; in the Electros provisions, Art. II, s 1, cl. 2,
and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of
President, Art. II, s 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, s 2, cl. 2, and the
superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second
Amendments, as well as in ss 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all
these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
The Court has yet to explain how human beings within the womb fail to qualify as "persons"
under the terms of the Constitution, while corporations and other artificial legal beings are
constitutional persons for some purposes. Cf Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 495-97
(1927) (holding that a corporation is a constitutional person for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause). Professor Lugosi explores this judicial deficiency in his article, Charles I. Lugosi,
Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in
Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119 (2007). One suspects finding
that the unborn child is a constitutional person would not have been difficult, had the Court
employed the same level of creativity and ingenuity it showed in finding a right to abortion in the
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the right to prescribe and use contraception
emanating from the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights." Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965).
42. Id.
43. 410 U.S. at 157, n. 54.
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unborn child due to advancing medical knowledge about the nature of
pregnancy and the characteristics of the unborn child." Unlike their
eighteenth-century counterparts, doctors and scientists in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were in the process of acquiring sufficient scientific
knowledge about pregnancy to conclude that the unborn child was a
separate human being from conception and therefore worthy of legal
protection. 5 The Court's reliance upon the absence of an eighteenth-
century case holding that the unborn child was a "constitutional person"
when deciding a case in the 1970s is as foolish as if the Court were to
conclude that the absence of a case holding that the internet is a means of
human communication removes the internet from free speech protections
contained within the First Amendment.46
As for the second point, it is difficult to predict what the Court's view
would have been had it taken seriously Texas's claim of competing
constitutional interests, notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's cavalier
dismissal, "[b]ut if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life
without due process of law, and if the mother's condition is the sole
determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the
Amendment's command?".4 ' The constitutionality of a state's failure to
protect the life of the unborn was not before the Court in Roe, and it is
unlikely to have arisen under the Texas statute at issue in the case.
If such a case had been presented to the Court in the early 1970s, most
likely it would have come from courts in Alaska, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, New York or Washington, since these jurisdictions had eliminated
virtually all restrictions on abortion during the first half of pregnancy.48 It
is possible that an unborn child (through his or her father or other next
friend) might have sought an injunction to stop the mother from obtaining
an abortion, arguing that the state had a constitutional obligation to protect
the child's life.49 Such a claim might have been rejected due to the absence
44. See e.g. JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW 26-48 (Cambridge
University Press 1988).
45. Joseph W. Dellapenna, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 257-261, 281-
284 (2006); James Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 40-50, 61-69 (1985). For an analysis as
contemporary medical discoveries regarding pregnancy and abortion may impact abortion
jurisprudence, see Jason A. Adkins, Note, Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel: The Lochner Era
and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 MINN. L. REv. 500 (2005).
46. Cf Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (free speech protections
limited federal Communications Decency Act provisions seeking to protect minors from harmful
material on the Internet)..
47. 410 U.S. at 157, n. 54.
48. 1970 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 103, codified at Alaska Stat. 18.16.010 to 18.16.090; D.C.
Code Ann. § 22-201 (1973); 1970 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 1, § 2, codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. §
453.16; 1970 N.Y. Laws, ch. 127, codified at N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.05(3), 125.15(2), 125.20(3),
125.40-125.60; and 1970 Wash. Laws, ch. 3 codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §9.02.100. For a
comprehensive history of various state statutes enacted between 1967 and 1973, see Paul
Benjamin Linton, Enforcement of State Abortion Statutes After Roe: A State-by-State Analysis, 67
U.DET. L. REv. 157 (1990).
49. Whether the Court would ever recognize the constitutional personhood of the unborn is
the subject of a debate between Professor Nathan Schlueter and Judge Robert Bork. See
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of any state action," or by adopting a narrow procedural interpretation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Any claim that the
Equal Protection clause was violated by omitting the unborn from laws
protecting the life of infants and other born persons might have been
answered by denying that unborn children and born children are similarly
situated due to the unborn child's physical location within the mother's
body."
Or just maybe the Court would have found that the vulnerability of the
unborn and the newborn are sufficiently similar to require equal protection
of both (at least in cases when the abortion is not necessary to protect the
life of the mother)53 and enjoined the threatened abortion.
EXPANSION OF ROE'S FLAWED REASONING
In the nineteen years between the creation of a right to abortion in Roe
and the reaffirmation of its constitutional status in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, " the Court issued opinions regarding abortion at least twenty-three
times.5 This is largely due to the legislative, as opposed to judicial, nature
Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on Abortion, First Things (Jan. 2003),
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?idarticle=424 (last visited June 5, 2008).
50. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 n.8 (1996) ("Although the termination proceeding
in this case was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption petition, rather than by a
state agency, the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M. L. B. resists the
imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-
child relationships.").
51. DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (rejected liability arising under the
Constitution for government officials' failure to protect children, even in cases when officials
have notice that the children's lives are threatened).
52. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (genetic and intended mother
denied custody of embryos for implantation); AZ. v. B.Z., 725 N.E. 2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (same);
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (same); and Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.
App. 2006) (same). Cf Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (state hospital's urine
tests of pregnant patients to obtain evidence of cocaine use were unreasonable searches absent
patients' consent, even if ultimate goal was to get pregnant women off drugs and into treatment).
53. See Teresa Stanton Collett, The Courts' Confused (and Confusing) Understanding of the
Creation and Taking of Human Life, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 265, 279-82 (2007) (discussing the law
governing the killing of non-aggressors in order to preserve life); Cf HCA v. Miller, 118 S.W.3d
758 (Tex. 2003) (rejecting battery claim by parents of prematurely born infant due to life-
sustaining efforts of the hospital); Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151 (Wash. 2007)
(rejecting parents claim of medical malpractice due to successful resuscitative medical treatment
of infant who was born without a heart beat, and survived with severe and permanent disabilities).
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975);
Singleton v. Wulff 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979); Williams v. Zbaraz, 442 U.S. 1309 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); H. L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54(1986); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Rust v.
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of the majority's opinion in Roe,56 and the public's resistance to the
seemingly unlimited nature of the abortion right that emerged from the
Court's definition of "health" in Doe v. Bolton.57
Numerous other commentators have described the remarkable
performance of the Court as the "[n]ation's 'ex officio medical board,"'58
striking down laws requiring parental consent prior to performance of
abortion on a minor,59 overturning state requirements that a second
physician be present during a post-viability abortion to provide immediate
medical care for any child surviving the abortion6" and invalidating bans on
abortion by saline amniocentesis, notwithstanding clear evidence that other
methods of abortion were available that were safer for the mother.6 A
detailed review of all of the Court's abortion cases is not required, however,
to establish the point that the Court erected an ambitious regulatory scheme
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
During the confirmation hearings of Justices Alito and Roberts, Senator Arlen Specter claimed
that the Court had 38 occasions to overrule Roe. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Samuel Alito To Be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 321 (2006) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Do you agree that Casey is a super precedent or a super stare decisis as
Judge Luttig said?"); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
144-45 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking
Judge Roberts whether Roe qualified as a "super-duper precedent in light ... of 38 occasions to
overrule it"). Our numbers differ due to additional cases between 1992, the year Casey was
decided, and 2005, the year of the hearings regarding Justice Roberts, and in part because of my
exclusion of cases declined by the Court.
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("But the Court's sweeping invalidation
of any restrictions on abortion during the first trimester is impossible to justify under that
standard, and the conscious weighing of competing factors that the Court's opinion apparently
substitutes for the established test is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a
judicial one."
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). "We agree with the District Court, 319 F.Supp., at 1058, that the
medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may
relate to health." Id. at 192.
The effect of this broad language is evidenced by a statement of Dr. Warren Hem of Colorado, the
author of the standard textbook on abortion procedures. "I will certify that any pregnancy is a
threat to a woman's life and could cause grievous injury to her physical health." H.R. Rep. No.
108-58, H.R. Rep. No. 58, 108TH Cong., 1ST Sess. 2003, 2003 WL 1789189 (Leg.Hist.) at 19.
58. See e.g., David M. Smolin, Abortion Legislation after Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services: Model Statutes and Commentaries, 20 Cumb. L. Rev. 71 (1990); Paul Benjamin Linton,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REv. 15 (1993); and Clarke Forsythe & Steven Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v.
Wade: Why Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85 (2005). The
phrase "nation's ex officio medical board" comes from Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976) (White, J. dissenting) ("That should end our inquiry, unless we
purport to be not only the country's continuous constitutional convention but also its ex officio
medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and
standards throughout the United States.").
59. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
60. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769-71
(1986).
61. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77.
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on the faulty foundation of Roe. Examination of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey62 and Stenberg v. Carhart63 will suffice.
THE HUBRIS OF CASEY
Notwithstanding the Court's increasing demands that states end their
attempts to restrict (or at least regulate) abortion, state legislatures
throughout the country continued to pass various abortion-related laws.
Pennsylvania passed one of the most comprehensive abortion laws in the
country in 1989. It was largely modeled after the Ohio city ordinance
rejected by the Court in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc.' The Pennsylvania law required that women be provided specific
types of information prior to obtaining their consent to abortions; that a
forty-eight hour waiting period be observed prior to performance of the
abortion; that a parent consent prior to the performance of an abortion on a
minor; that the husband be notified prior to the performance of an abortion
on the wife; and that abortion providers report various information
including the type of procedure performed, the duration of gestation prior to
the abortion, and the existence and nature of complications.65 When
abortion providers challenged the constitutionality of the law, the law was
vigorously defended in every court, including the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Unfortunately, at that time only four of the justices were prepared to
overrule Roe and return the issue to the people;6 6 two were adamant that
Roe be retained;67 and three were ambivalent about the Court's application
of the Constitution to the regulation of abortion but persuaded that the
institutional integrity of the Court required continued protection of the
practice.68 With opinions on the Court so divided, the ambivalent justices
prevailed and the plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter became the controlling rule of law.69 These justices were unwilling
to affirm the initial correctness of Roe, instead declaring majestically, "the
immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue,
but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding."70
Supporters and opponents of abortion rights have criticized the plurality
opinion as unprincipled.7' At least one legal scholar has characterized it as
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality).
63. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
64. 476 U.S. 747 (1985).
65. Abortion Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3203-3220 (West 2008).
66. 505 U.S. at 912-14 (Stevens, J. dissenting); 505 U.S. at 923 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
67. Id. at 871 (plurality).
68. Id.
69. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.").
70. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
71. See e.g. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist
and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
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the worst Supreme Court decision ever,72 not withstanding other excellent
candidates for that title include Dred Scott v. Sandford 3and Korematsu v.
United States.74 Perhaps the passage from Casey receiving the most
negative attention is the plurality's extravagant statement of the judicially-
created right of decisional privacy.
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State. "
This "sweet mystery-of-life passage"" has been derided by legal
commentators,77 who have characterized it as "popular mythology,"78 the
Casey, 22 Const. Comment. 311 (2005); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of
Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 Fordham Ur. L.J. 675 (2004); Janet Benshoof,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue Burden Standard on Reproductive
Health Care, 269 JAMA 2249, 2252-53 (1993); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1980 (2002); Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans,
Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Establishing Neutrality Principles in State
Constitutional Law, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1151 (1993); and sources collected in n. 78 infra.
72. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE
DAME L.REv. 996 (2003).
73. 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that Americans of African descendant are incapable of being
citizens under the Constitution).
74. 321 U.S. 760 (1944) (sustaining the constitutionality of internment of Americans of
Japanese descent during World War II).
75. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. Based on this statement, the Court invalidated the Pennsylvania
requirement that a husband be notified of his wife's intention to obtain an abortion, absent the
wife providing the physician a written statement that (1) her spouse is not the father of the child;
(2) her spouse, after diligent effort, could not be located; (3) the pregnancy is a result of spousal
sexual assault, which has been reported to law enforcement; or (4) she has reason to believe that
the furnishing of notice to her spouse is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her
by her spouse or by another individual. Id. at 893-94; 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 3209 (West
2008).
76. Id. at 588 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
77. E.g., Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and "Tradition ", 39 Tex.
Tech. L. Rev. 261, 275 (2007) ("Other constitutional rights in the popular mythology are not
found anywhere in the Constitution itself, but the misperception is certainly understandable
because the United States Supreme Court has declared that people have a constitutional right to
privacy, to abortion, to homosexual sodomy, and even to 'define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at
85 1)); John M. Breen & Michael A. Scaperlanda, Never Get Out'a the Boat: Stenberg v. Carhart
and the Future ofAmerican Law, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 297, 312 (2006) ("The Court is able to ignore
this violence because, in the case of abortion, it has abandoned the idea of ordered liberty in favor
of a maximal conception of human freedom."); Kenneth L. Grasso, The Rights of Monads or of
Intrinsically Social Beings? Social Ontology and Rights Talk, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 233, 237-38
(2005) (characterizing the language from Casey as creating a " '[m]egaright' of individual
autonomy" (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A
Cautionary Note on the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 181, 191 (2006)
("It is the same Supreme Court that in one breath, per Justice Kennedy in a breathtaking bit of
anti-metaphysics, identifies the 'heart of liberty [as] the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,' that, in a next breath,
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product of "philosopher-kings, 79 "startling,"" ° "radical"81 and representing
"the view that moral relativism is a constitutional command."8
The Court subsequently attempted to limit the reach of this passage in
Washington v. Glucksberg,83 a case rejecting the claim of a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. Yet the language reemerged as a
constitutional justification for finding all criminal prohibitions of sodomy
unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas.84
Even more troubling than the plurality's puerile philosophizing is the
Justices' demand that the American people submit to the Court's judgment
regarding abortion.
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a
case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive
controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its
decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does
not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution.85
The contending sides might have more respect for the Court's mandate
if the Court could definitively identify the text of the Constitution
compelling its decision. Absent such identification, there seems little
justification for accepting the Justices' political judgment as superior to that
of other citizens.
The plurality then suggests that any hope of the citizenry that abortion
would be returned to the political process is diminished in direct proportion
to public criticism of the Court's usurpation of the issue. "[T]o overrule
under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any
serious question." 6  As Justice Rehnquist notes in his critique of the
plurality, "when the Court has ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently
prevented from overruling that decision for the sole reason that it was
per the same Justice Kennedy, makes metaphysical claims that would delight the medieval mind."
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)).
78. Jacob, supra n. 78, at 275.
79. Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as
Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1139, 1143 (2004).
80. Francis George, Lecture, Law and Culture in the United States (Notre Dame L. Sch., Jan.
30, 2003), in 48 AM. J. JURIS. 131, 145 (2003).
81. G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the
Federal Criminal Law, BYU L. Rev. 829, 876-77 n. 130 (2002).
82. Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 45, 63 (1998).
83. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726-27 (1997) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851); see
also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997).
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
85. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866 (plurality).
86. 505 U.S. at 867.
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incorrect, unless opposition to the original decision has died away."87
Justice Scalia leveled an even sharper criticism:
The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this
Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a
Volk who will be "tested by following," and whose very "belief in
themselves" is mystically bound up in their "understanding" of a
Court that "speak[s] before all others for their constitutional
ideals"-with the somewhat more modest role envisioned for these
lawyers by the Founders.88
Justice Scalia then quoted the Federalist Papers as establishing the
founding fathers' less exalted understanding of the role of the judiciary.
Complaints of overreaching by judges have a long history in our nation.
Thomas Jefferson was one of the early critics of the United States Supreme
Court.
[T]he judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and
harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon
showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that
the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave
them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions,
seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and
unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions, nevertheless,
become law by precedent, sapping, by little and little, the
foundations of the constitution, and working its change by
construction before any one has perceived that that invisible and
helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its
substance. 89
Abraham Lincoln expressed similar dissatisfaction with judicial
overreaching in his first inaugural address. "If the policy of the
government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court ... the people will
have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal." 90
The Casey plurality's abstract reasoning and complete disregard of the
primacy of democratic process in resolving difficult questions regarding our
common life has led some to publicly question whether the American
people remain in control of the nation's collective destiny. Introducing a
symposium in the November 1996 issue of First Things, "The End of
Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics," Fr. Richard John
Neuhaus wrote:
This symposium addresses many similarly troubling judicial
actions that add up to an entrenched pattern of government by
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (1992) (Scalia, J dissenting) (emphasis added).
89. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Monsieur A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823).
90. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres3 .html (last visited June 6, 2008).
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judges that is nothing less than the usurpation of politics. The
question here explored, in full awareness of its far-reaching
consequences, is whether we have reached or are reaching the point
where conscientious citizens can no longer give moral assent to the
existing regime. 9
In commenting on Casey and other opinions from the same judicial
term, Judge Robert Bork observed, "[t]his last term of the Supreme Court
brought home to us with fresh clarity what it means to be ruled by an
oligarchy. The most important moral, political, and cultural decisions
affecting our lives are steadily being removed from democratic control."92
Princeton Professor Robert George joined him in questioning the effect of
Casey on the American political system:
To say that the worst abuses of human rights have come from the
least democratic branch-the judiciary-is true, but of increasingly
questionable relevance to the crisis of democratic legitimacy
brought on by judicial action in the cause of abortion and
euthanasia. In practice, the American scheme of constitutional
democracy invests the courts with ultimate authority to decide what
the Constitution is to mean. Judicial action and appointments can,
and sometimes do, become major issues in national elections. The
refusal of the courts over more than twenty-three years to reverse
Roe v. Wade must, then, be accounted a failure of American
democracy.93
All of these concerns were expressed before the Court rejected the
partial-birth abortion bans of thirty-one states on the basis of one
physician's testimony and speculation by supporting experts.
INDIFFERENCE TO EVIDENCE IN CARHARTI
If the Casey plurality opinion exemplifies new heights of judicial
arrogance in its demands that the American people submit to its judgment
regarding the legal status of the unborn and the morality of abortion, the
majority opinion in Carhart I reflects new lows in judicial respect for facts
when adjudicating constitutional disputes.
As described by the majority, the issue before the Court in Carhart I
was "whether Nebraska's statute, making criminal the performance of a
'partial birth abortion,' violates the Federal Constitution, as interpreted in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey ... and Roe v.
91. The Editors, Introduction to THE END OF DEMOCRACY 3 (Mitchell S. Muncy, ed. 1997).
See also Charles W. Coleson, Kingdoms in Conflict in THE END OF DEMOCRACY 41 at 47
(Mitchell S. Muncy, ed. 1997) ("At what point does the government become sufficiently corrupt
that Christians must actively resist it? And, Has the United States, under its current judicial
regime, reached such a point?").
92. Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy in THE END OF DEMOCRACY 10, 10 (Mitchell S.
Muncy, ed. 1997).
93. Robert P. George, The Tyrant State in THE END OF DEMOCRACY 57, 61 (Mitchell S.
Muncy, ed. 1997).
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Wade . . ... 94 Ultimately the majority found that the statute was
unconstitutional because it contained no exception for procedures
performed to protect a woman's health since "substantial medical authority
supports the proposition that banning [this] particular abortion procedure
could endanger women's health."9 Yet the evidence presented to the trial
court reveals that the Nebraska legislature's conclusion that no health
exception was required was well supported by "substantial medical
authority."
The plaintiff, Dr. Carhart, was the only witness who had ever
performed partial-birth abortions (also known as "D&X" or "intact D & E"
abortions), and he testified that he only chose to perform a D&X when the
fetus presented in breech or where repositioning the fetus from a side
presentation resulted in a breech presentation.96 If the partial-birth abortion
procedure was medically superior to dismemberment abortion,97 it would
seem that Dr. Carhart would have repositioned the fetus to allow use of the
superior method, yet he did not do so. This fact suggests that his use of the
procedure was more a matter of convenience than of medical necessity.
None of the experts called to testify on the plaintiff's behalf had any
experience with the procedure. Dr. Stubblefield, the expert relied upon
extensively by the trial court "has not performed this procedure himself, nor
has he viewed anyone else perform it." 9  Similarly, Dr. Carhart's other
expert, Dr. Hodgson, "performed or supervised at least 30,000 abortions,"9 9
and yet had never intentionally performed an intact D&X.'t°
Notwithstanding these experts' lack of experience with or use of the
94. 530 U.S. at 929-30.
95. 530 U.S. at 938. The majority further determined that the statute was unconstitutional
because the definition of the proscribed procedure "covers a much broader category of
procedures" than partial-birth abortion. 530 U.S. at 939. The Court interpreted the statute to
include dismemberment (or dilation and evacuation "D & E") abortions, which "together with a
modified form of vacuum aspiration used in the early second trimester) accounts for about 95% of
all abortions performed from 12 to 20 weeks of gestational age." 530 U.S. at 924. While the
second holding required judicial gymnastics to avoid application of the common canons of
construction requiring courts to adopt narrowing constructions to avoid constitutional infirmity, it
is not the focus of this article's critique.
96. 972 F. Supp. at 522 n.20.
97. Dismemberment abortion is a descriptive name for the "dilation and evacuation"
procedure used in post-first trimester abortions. An abortion text provides the following
instructions to those seeking to learn the procedure.
To locate fetal parts, rotate the instrument right or left while concurrently closing and opening the
forceps. Upon feeling the calvarium or other fetal tissue, close the jaws firmly about it and draw it
through the canal using a combination of compression and rotation. Repeat this maneuver until all
major fetal parts are extracted and identified.
W. Martin Haskell, et al., Surgical Abortion After the First Trimester in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO
MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION, 123, 134 (Maureen Paul, et al., eds. 1999). The abortion
provider is cautioned to make sure that all fetal parts are removed to avoid post-operative
infection. "After completion of the D&E abortion, examine the pregnancy tissue. Although
complete reconstruction is not always possible, verify the presence of major fetal parts, including
pelvis, torso, calvarium, and extremities." Id. at 137.
98. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1112 (D. Neb. 1998).
99. Id. at 1105.
100. Id.
38 UNIV. OFST. THOMASJOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11
procedure, both Drs. Stubblefield and Hodgson were confident that some
circumstances existed in which the protection of a woman's health would
require its use.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
expressed similar unsubstantiated confidence. "A select panel convened by
the ACOG could identify no circumstances under which this procedure
[intact D&X] ... would be the only option to save the life or preserve the
health of the woman. An intact D&X, however, may be the best or most
appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or
preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with
the patient, based upon the woman's particular circumstances can make this
decision."''
A more objective opinion was expressed by the American Medical
Association (AMA) when it stated that "there does not appear to be any
identified situation in which intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure
to induce abortion."'02  Based on this conclusion, the AMA issued
statements supporting the federally proposed Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of
1997, House Resolution (HR) 122. The AMA press release described
partial-birth abortion as "broadly disfavored-both by experts and the public
.... It is a procedure which is never the only appropriate procedure and
has no history in peer reviewed medical literature or in accepted medical
practice development."'' 1 3 The AMA Board of Trustees Fact Sheet on HR
1122 stated that "[i]ntact D&X is not an accepted 'medical practice' ....
the Board's expert scientific report recommends against its use."' '04
The conclusion of the AMA is supported by public statements of
recognized abortion experts. "'I have very serious reservations about this
procedure,' said Colorado physician Warren Hem, M.D. The author of
Abortion Practice, the nation's most widely used textbook on abortion
standards and procedures, Dr. Hem specializes in late-term procedures. He
has been critical of D&X, stating, "'[y]ou really can't defend it."" 0 5
The "substantial medical authority" relied upon by the majority in
overturning the partial-birth abortion bans passed by thirty-one states 10 6 was
101. Id. at 1105 n. 10 (quoting a statement by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists from January, 1997).
102. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 872 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting AMA Policy
H-5.982).
103. Press Release, American Medical Association, AMA Supports H.R. 1122 As Amended,
Statement by Nancy W. Dickey, MD, Chair of the AMA Board of Trustees (May 20, 1997).
104. American Medical Association, AMA Board of Trustees FACT SHEET on HR 1112 (June
1997). Notwithstanding the AMA's clear reliance upon the absence of evidence of the safety and
necessity of the procedure, and its refusal to rely on mere speculation, the district court
characterized the AMA's statements as "irrelevant" and "political rhetoric." 972 F. Supp. at 525
n.27.
105. Diane M. Gainelli, Outlawing abortion method: Veto-proof majority in House votes to
prohibit late-term procedure," 38 Amer. Med. News I (Nov. 20, 1995).
106. See Carhart 1, 530 U.S. at 979 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) ("Ignoring substantial medical
and ethical opinion, the Court substitutes its own judgment for the judgment of Nebraska and
some 30 other States and sweeps the law away.").
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the testimony of a single physician plaintiff and unsubstantiated speculation
by his experts and a professional association. Similar to Casey's command
that the people submit to the Court's judgment regarding the legality of
abortion, Carhart I commanded Americans to accept physicians initiating
childbirth for the purpose of killing the child immediately before he or she
emerged from the womb."17 Such was the state of abortion law prior to the
appointment of the two newest justices of the United States Supreme Court,
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito.
CARHARTIH
Six years after ruling in Carhart I, the Court again took up the question
of whether the Constitution prohibited bans on the partial-birth abortion
procedure. Consolidating appeals from the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, the Court considered "whether, notwithstanding
Congress's determination that a health exception was unnecessary to
preserve the health of the mother, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise
unconstitutional on its face."' 8 Similar to the evidentiary record in Carhart
I, none of the physicians testifying at the trials could identify a single
instance in which they had intentionally performed a D&X abortion
because it was the medically superior method of abortion in protecting the
health of the mother.109
In contrast to Carhart I, a peer-review study of partial-birth abortion
existed, but was inconclusive as to whether D&X was superior to D&E." °
Dr. Chasen, an early advocate of D&X abortion and the author of the study,
testified that there was no difference between the partial-birth and
dismemberment abortions in the mother's blood loss, procedure time, or
short-term complication rates. 1 ' Dr. Chasen admitted that the study did not
prove that D&X is superior to D&E, and also testified that the study could
not claim that D&X was "as safe as" D&E.
1 2
107. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 979 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) ("D & X's stronger resemblance
to infanticide means Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of disrespect
for life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and society, which depend for their
sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect. The Court is without authority to
second-guess this conclusion."). The difficulty in distinguishing the practice of partial-birth
abortion from infanticide is the primary point argued in the amicus brief filed in the Supreme
Court on behalf of the States of Louisiana and Mississippi. Brief ofAmici Curiae La. and Miss. in
Support of Petitioners, 2000 WL 228483 (U.S. 2000).
108. Gonzales v. Carhart, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006); Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed'n. of
America, Inc., 547 U.S. 1205 (2006).
109. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n. v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, at 308 (2nd Cir. 2006) (Straub, J.
dissenting) ("the plaintiffs and their experts agreed that they had never encountered a situation
where D & X was the only available procedure or where the mother's health required a D & X").
110. Stephen T. Chasen, et al., Dilation and Evacuation at >20 Weeks: Comparison of
Operative Techniques, 190 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYENCOL. 1180 (2004).
111. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The study found no significant
difference in blood loss, procedure time, or short-term complication rates between the
procedures.").
112. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n. v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, at 308-09 (2nd Cir. 2006) (Straub, J.
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The study showed that for the small group of women for whom
subsequent pregnancy information was available, spontaneous birth
occurred in 2 of 17 (11.8%) of the D&X group, and 2 of 45 (4.4%) of the
D&E group. Although this difference may be statistically insignificant
given the few patients in the study, it was sufficient to signal a cause for
concern for some of the experts. The study also showed that the D&X
group experienced a higher rate of cervical laceration (2.4%) than the D&E
group (.8%). Dr. Sprang derived this number from the data in the Chasen
study. While the sample size was too small to be statistically significant, it
"tends to show that D&X has the potential to cause more trauma to the
cervix." "3
These facts led the federal district court in New York to conclude:
After hearing all of the evidence, as well as considering the record
before Congress, the Court does not believe that many of Plaintiffs'
purported reasons for why D & X is medically necessary are
credible; rather they are theoretical or false. In addition, Dr.
Chasen's study was initiated with the knowledge that Congress was
considering a partial-birth abortion ban. Not only did the study fail
to prove the alleged safety advantages of D & X over D & E, it
raised serious questions about the potential health risks to women
that D & X poses, namely, the risk of future preterm births due to
increased cervical dilation during a D & X." 4
Nonetheless, the court felt constrained by Carhart I's "substantial
medical authority" standard and struck down the federal Act.
The Government contends that the lack of a health exception does
not make the Act unconstitutional if, looking at the congressional
record supplemented by the trial testimony, the Court determines
that Congress was reasonable in its finding that D & X is never
medically necessary to protect a woman's health. Stenberg does not
countenance that approach. Instead, the relevant inquiry (assuming,
as the Court does, that Turner applies) is whether Congress
reasonably determined, based on substantial evidence, that there is
no significant body of medical opinion believing the procedure to
have safety advantages for some women. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at
937, 120 S.Ct. 2597. Under that standard, Congress's factfindings
were not reasonable and based on substantial evidence." 5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. " 6 Thus Justices
Thomas and Kennedy were prophetic when they said that the standard
adopted in Carhart I would render abortion law subject to the veto of a
single physician or allow a single abortion provider to set "abortion policy
for the State ... not the legislature or the people."" 7
dissenting).
113. Id. at 309.
114. Nat'l. Abortion Fed'n., v. Ashcroft, 330 F.Supp.2d 436, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
115. Id. at 488.
116. Nat'l. Abortion Fed'n., 437 F.3d 278.
117. 530 U.S. at 965 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
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The Supreme Court granted review. By the time oral arguments were
presented to the Court, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits had declared the Act unconstitutional." 8 In a bitterly divided
five to four vote, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that
the Act was sufficiently clear to give physicians adequate warning of the
conduct that was prohibited, 119 that Congress was within its constitutional
authority to proscribe this particular abortion technique 2 ° and that the
prohibition did not unduly burden women's right to obtain abortions. 2 ' In
reaching these conclusions, the majority made clear that the state's power to
regulate abortion is not limited to cases where medical opinion is
undivided.
As illustrated by respondents' arguments and the decisions of the
Courts of Appeals, Stenberg has been interpreted to leave no margin of
error for legislatures to act in the face of medical uncertainty.
A zero tolerance policy would strike down legitimate abortion
regulations, like the present one, if some part of the medical
community were disinclined to follow the proscription. This is too
exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power, exercised in
this instance under the Commerce Clause, to regulate the medical
profession. Considerations of marginal safety, including the
balance of risks, are within the legislative competence when the
regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends. When
standard medical options are available, mere convenience does not
suffice to displace them; and if some procedures have different
risks than others, it does not follow that the State is altogether
barred from imposing reasonable regulations. 122
The Court's recognition of legislative authority is significant in
determining the constitutionality of other abortion-related regulations in the
absence of unanimous medical opinion.'23
118. Nat'l. Abortion Fed'n., v. Gonzalez, 437 F.3d 278 (2nd Cir. 2006); Carhart v. Gonzales,
413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed'n. ofAm. Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d
1163 (9th Cir. 2006). Due to the timing of the opinion, the opinion of the Second Circuit was not
before the Supreme Court. This omission is unfortunate since the evidentiary record developed
in United States District Court for New York is much more comprehensive that those of the
California and Nebraska courts. Compare National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330
F.Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y.2004); Planned Parenthood Federation of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320
F.Supp.2d 957, 1019 (N.D.Cal.2004); and Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.Supp.2d 805, 1011
(Neb.2004).
119. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628 (2007).
120. Id. at 1632-33.
121. Id. at 1637.
Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context
any more than it does in other contexts. See Hendricks, supra, at 360, n. 3, 117 S.Ct. 2072.The
medical uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition creates significant health risks provides a
sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden.
Id.
122. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1638 (internal citations omitted).
123. Examples of such regulation include laws requiring women be informed of the possibility
that a fetus feels pain after 20 weeks of development or that some research supports the
conclusion that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer.
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Justice Ginsburg's dissent attacks the majority for its disregard of
precedent,2 4 its use of evocative language 125 and its willingness to defer to
Congressional findings of fact. 612  She accuses the majority of holding an
outdated and misogynistic view of women, 12' and denying the role of
abortion in promoting sexual equality. 28 The fact that three justices joined
her in asserting this last point evidences an attempt to relocate the
constitutional grounding of abortion rights. What began as a right grounded
in the privacy of the patient-physician relationship 129 subsequently became
a woman's liberty interest encompassed in the due process clause. 30 To
redefine the right as emanating from the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would permit heightened scrutiny of all abortion-
related laws,' which in turn would result in a repudiation of Casey's claim
of greater respect for legislative judgments dealing with this deeply divisive
issue.132 Such a future, however, requires the persuasion of at least one
additional justice that women's equal status in society requires access to
abortion.
IV. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL POLITICS IN BUILDING A
CULTURE OF LIFE
Supporting reversal of Roe and the eventual protection of unborn
children requires Catholics to consider presidential and senatorial
candidates' stances on abortion, since it is the President who has the power
to nominate and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint justices
of the Supreme Court.' The differing treatment of partial-birth abortion
124. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1640-43.
125. Id. at 1650.
126. Id. at 1653-54.
127. "This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and
under the Constitution-ideas that have long since been discredited." Id. at 1649.
128. Id. at 1641-42.
129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
130. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
131. See U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 552-53 (1996).
132. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
133. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2. Compare Press Release, Barack Obama, Obama Statement on
the 35th anniversary of Roe v. Wade (Jan. 22, 2008) ("With one more vacancy on the Supreme
Court, we could be looking at a majority hostile to a women's fundamental right to choose for the
first time since Roe v. Wade. The next president may be asked to nominate that Supreme Court
justice. That is what is at stake in this election."), available at
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/01/22/obama-statement-on_35th-annive.php; with Press
Release, Hillary Clinton, On Anniversary of Roe, Clinton Announces Agenda for Reproductive
Health Care (Jan. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=5404 ("When I'm President, I will appoint
judges to our courts who understand that Roe v. Wade isn't just binding legal precedent, it is the
touchstone of our reproductive freedom, the embodiment of our most fundamental rights, and no
one - no judge, no governor, no Senator, no President - has the right to take it away."); and John
McCain, Remarks of John McCain at CPAC (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/News/Speeches/B639AE8B-5A9F-41D5-88A7-
874CBEFA2C40.htm ("I intend to nominate judges who have proven themselves worthy of our
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bans by the Rehnquist and Roberts courts evidences the importance of the
Justices' interpretative approach to the Constitution. A court dominated by
Justices who embrace the idea of a "living constitution"'' 34 too often will
find constitutional barriers to the political outcomes they dislike, 135 while
ignoring constitutional text in affirming government actions of which they
approve. 3 6  Justices embracing the textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation' 37 may refuse constitutional protection to long-enduring
practices because of the absence of a controlling text 138 or a sharply limited
reading of the text. 139  Which approach is most favorable to the
development of a culture of life generally is a question of some debate.
41
On the pre-eminent issue of abortion, 14' however, only justices adopting the
trust that they take as their sole responsibility the enforcement of laws made by the people's
elected representatives, judges of the character and quality of Justices Roberts and Alito, judges
who can be relied upon to respect the values of the people whose rights, laws and property they
are sworn to defend.").
134. Justice Brennan is often recognized as one of the foremost defenders of this approach
based on his speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown University on Oct. 12,
1985. Reproduced in ORIGINALISM, A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 55-70 (Calabresi, Steven
G. ed., Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007). Justice Breyer has articulated a related, but slightly more
pragmatic, theory of constitutional interpretation. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (Alfred A.
Knopf 2005).
For a concise overview of modes of constitutional interpretation, see Thomas E. Baker,
Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 57, 68-93 (2004).
135. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. (Constitution forbids criminalization of non-commercial
private consensual sexual activity between adults).
136. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that economic development is
adequate "public use" to satisfy constitutional requirements for government's exercise of eminent
domain powers).
137. One of the most prominent proponents to this mode of constitutional interpretation is
Justice Scalia. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Much of the contemporary debate regarding the modes of
constitutional interpretation was initiated by a speech to the American Bar Association on July 9,
1985 by then United States Attorney General Edwin Meese, III. The speech is reproduced in
ORIGINALISM, A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 13.
138. See Troxell v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Washington statute providing that court
may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve best interest of child, violated
substantive due process rights of mother). Justice Scalia dissented on the basis that a parent's
right to direct the upbringing of a child is not found in the text of the constitution. Id. at 91-93.
139. See Employment Division, Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (refusing
constitutional protection to religious activities that are the subject of "neutral law[s] of generally
applicability"), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
140. See Kevin E. Schmiesing, Another Social Justice Tradition: Catholic Conservatives, 2
U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 208 (2005).
141. This is explained by Pope John Paul, II in the encyclical, Evangelium Vitae [Gospel of
Life]:
The real purpose of civil law is to guarantee an ordered social coexistence in true
justice, so that all may "lead a quiet and peaceable life, godly and respectful in every
way" (1 Tim 2:2). Precisely for this reason, civil law must ensure that all members of
society enjoy respect for certain fundamental rights which innately belong to the
person, rights which every positive law must recognize and guarantee. First and
fundamental among these is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human being.
While public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which-
were it prohibited- would cause more serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize
as a right of individuals-even if they are the majority of the members of society-an
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textualist view have evidenced a willingness to return the question to the
democratic process. 142 This suggests that Catholics should support the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices who recognize the absence of any
textual basis for Roe and its progeny, 143 as well as the importance of
democratic processes in resolving the contested question of whether the
unborn are entitled to the status of "constitutional persons."'"
The positions of presidential candidates on abortion are also relevant to
the appointment of many cabinet members, who as members of the
executive branch exercise substantial influence on federal policy regarding
abortion. 45  The Attorney General of the United States is charged with
defending federal laws against constitutional challenges. A lukewarm
defense of laws seeking to restrict or regulate abortion can be deadly both
to the laws and to those the laws are designed to protect.'46 The Secretary
of Health and Human Services directs the Centers for Disease Control and
offence against other persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental a right as the
right to life. The legal toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way claim to be
based on respect for the conscience of others, precisely because society has the right
and the duty to protect itself against the abuses which can occur in the name of
conscience and under the pretext of freedom.
John Paul, II, Evangelium Vitae (Gospel of Life) § 71 (March 25, 1995), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/j ohn-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jp-
ii enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae en.html (last visited June 7, 2008); see also John M. Breen,
Modesty and Moralism: Justice, Prudence, and Abortion: A Reply to Skeel and Stuntz, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 243-51 (2008).
142. No justice has expressed support for the view that the unborn are constitutional persons.
Robert Bork, Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on Abortion (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?id-article=424.
143. "We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled
consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases." Casey, 505
U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This opinion was joined by Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas.
144. In her response to Justice Scalia's essay, Common-Law courts in the Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Professor
Mary Ann Glendon reminds us:
Tyranny of the majority does sound alarming. It conjures up visions of peasants with
their pitchforks storming the scientist's castle. Small wonder that it is a favorite slogan
of those who would prefer to forget that one of the most basic American rights is the
freedom to govern ourselves and our communities by bargaining, education,
persuasion, and, yes, majority vote.
Mary Ann Glendon, Comment in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 95, 113 (Amy Gutmarn ed., 1997).
145. Id.
146. New Hampshire Attorney General Peter Heed's initial defense of that state's parental
notice law is an example of the harm that can arise from a luke-warm defense. The Attorney
General presented no challenge to the plaintiffs' affidavits regarding the need for a health
exception in the law. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Objection to Request for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 2003 WL 25494036 (Dec. 3, 2003). See also Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed, 296 F.Supp.2d 59, 62 (D.N.H. 2003) ("The
Attorney General filed an objection, and the plaintiffs filed a reply. No surreply was filed. The
parties have agreed that the court may decide the plaintiffs' requests for a declaratory judgment
and permanent injunctive relief on the merits based on their present filings.") The implications
from this failure are discussed in Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Modesty and Abortion, 59
S.C.L.Rev. 701 (2008). Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (assessment of fees against
physician-intervenor did not give him standing to appeal judgment striking down Illinois abortion
law after state attorney general settled the case).
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Prevention, which accumulates information regarding the incidence and
effects of abortion. 147  The Secretary of State advises the President and
represents the United States in matters related to foreign affairs, including
the impact of proposed treaties and actions within the United Nations
regarding the international law of abortion. 14' These are just a sampling of
the decisions that the President and members of the executive branch make,
which impact the prevalence of abortion in our country and the world.
149
Presidential support and veto of legislation are equally important to
think about when considering the importance of a presidential candidate's
position on abortion. President Clinton repeatedly vetoed federal partial-
birth abortion bans, notwithstanding clear majorities in both legislative
147. There is no national requirement for data submission or reporting regarding induced
abortions. See Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, CDC's Abortion Surveillance System: FAQ (Jan. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/DataStats/Abortion.htm (last visited June 7, 2008). Four
states have no reporting requirement; three states and the District of Columbia have only
voluntary reporting requirements. Of the forty-six states having some requirement, only twenty-
nine include medical (non-surgical) induced abortions. Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Policies
in Brief Abortion Reporting Requirements (May 1, 2008),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_.ARR.pdf (last visited June 7, 2008).
The most recent CDC report involves abortions performed in 2004. See supra note 147. Statistics
related to abortions performed in 2005 are available from researchers at the Alan Guttmacher
Institute, the research affiliate of Planned Parenthood..Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the
United States: incidence and access to services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPRO.
HEALTH 6 (2008), also available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/4000608.pdf.
A current bill in the United States House of Representatives would require the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, acting through the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and
the Director of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), to expand and intensify NIMH
research and related activities with respect to post-abortion depression and psychosis. Post-
Abortion Depression Research and Care Act of 2007, H.R. 1457, 1 10th Congress (2007),
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation)
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-1457 (accessed May 4, 2008).
148. An example of this is President George W. Bush's reinstatement of the "Mexico City
policy."
The Mexico City Policy announced by President Reagan in 1984 required
nongovernmental organizations to agree as a condition of their receipt of Federal funds
that such organizations would neither perform nor actively promote abortion as a
method of family planning in other nations. This policy was in effect until it was
rescinded on January 22, 1993.
It is my conviction that taxpayer funds should not be used to pay for abortions or
advocate or actively promote abortion, either here or abroad. It is therefore my belief
that the Mexico City Policy should be restored. Accordingly, I hereby rescind the
"Memorandum for the Acting Administrator of the Agency for International
Development, Subject: AID Family Planning Grants/Mexico City Policy," dated
January 22, 1993, and I direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development to reinstate in full all of the requirements of the Mexico City
Policy in effect on January 19, 1993.
Office of the White House Press Secretary, Memorandum for the Administrator of the United
States Agency of International Development (Jan. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010123-5.html. See also Austin Ruse, Dangerous
Mischief at the United Nations: Abortion as the Law of the World in BACK TO THE DRAWING
BOARD: THE FUTURE OF THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT 319-28 (Teresa R. Wagner, ed. 2003).
149. For a contrary view regarding the importance of abortion in deciding which presidential
candidate to support, see Susan J. Stabile, One Catholic's Thoughts on Voting for a President, 47
J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES 303 (2008).
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chambers supporting the legislation.15 President George W. Bush proudly
signed the ban when presented to him.'5' Both of President Bush's former
opponents, in contrast, would have vetoed the ban, insisting that the law
contain a health exception.152
Congressional elections are also important in extending legal
protections to the unborn. The absence of prolife majorities in both houses
has stymied attempts by Congressional leaders to insure interstate
enforcement of state requirements of parental involvement in young girls'
decisions to obtain abortions.'53 Similarly, there has been no movement on
proposed national legislation insuring that women, prior to obtaining
abortions in the second half of their pregnancies, are informed of the
growing scientific consensus that fetuses feel pain after twenty weeks of
development.'54 Efforts to expand existing protections of health-care
150. President Clinton than vetoed HR1833, "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 1995," on April
10, 1996. Congress attempted to override the veto but after gaining enough votes in the Housed
they failed in the Senate with a vote of 57 to 41. President Clinton vetoed HR 1122 , "Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban of 1997,"on October 10, 1997. Again an over-ride was attempted. The House
again had enough votes for the 2/3 majority that was required and voted to override the veto on
July 23, 1998. The Senate again was unable to get the needed 67 votes and the veto was defeated
64 - 36, only 3 votes short.
151. Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Signs Partial Birth Abortion Act of
2003 (Nov. 5, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031105-1.html#.
152. "On the issue of partial-birth or so-called late-term abortion, I would sign a law banning
that procedure, provided that doctors have the ability to save a women's life or to act if her health
is severely at risk. [But] the main issue is whether or not the Roe v. Wade decision is going to be
overturned. I support a woman's right to choose; my opponent does not." Al Gore, Presidential
Debate, Boston MA (Oct. 3, 2000), transcript available at
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/debates/transcripts/u221003.html.
Senator John Kerry, the Democratic Presidential nominee in 2004, voted six times
against a federal partial-birth abortion ban; opposed parental involvement in minors' abortion
decisions; and has vowed to reverse the Mexico City policy and to only appoint Supreme Court
justices who will uphold a woman's right to choose. Peter Kirsanow, Abortion Absolutism, NAT'L
REV. ONLINE (June 21, 2004) at
http://www.nationalreview.com/commentVkirsanow200406150910.asp.
Current presidential candidates vary in their positions on abortion. Senator Barack
Obama opposes the federal partial-birth abortion ban and has announced his desire to pass the
Freedom of Choice Act, a proposed federal law that would largely enact Roe v. Wade as a matter
of national statutory law. Obama, Barack, Obama Statement on the 35th anniversary of Roe v.
Wade (Jan. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/01/22/obama-statement on_35th annive.php.
Senator Hillary Clinton has stated that continued availability of abortion will be key to
her decisions regarding judicial appointments and that she will sign the Freedom of Choice Act.
Clinton, Hillary, On Anniversary of Roe, Clinton Announces Agenda for Reproductive Health
Care (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/release/view/?id=5404.
"John McCain believes Roe v. Wade is a flawed decision that must be overturned, and as
president he will nominate judges who understand that courts should not be in the business of
legislating from the bench. Constitutional balance would be restored by the reversal of Roe v.
Wade, returning the abortion question to the individual states. The difficult issue of abortion
should not be decided by judicial fiat." On the Issues: Human Dignity and the Sanctity of Life,
http://www.johnmccain.comInforming/issues/95b 18512-d5b6-456e-90a2-12028d71 df58.htm.
153. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Transporting Minors for Immoral Purposes: The Case for the
Child Custody Protection Act & the Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, 16 HEALTH
MATRIX 107 (2005).
154. Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2007, S. 356, 1 10th Cong. (2007), GovTrack.us
(database of federal legislation), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl10-356 (last
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professionals' right to refuse to participate in abortion-related procedures
and processes have been rebuffed,'55 while Congressional efforts are
growing to enact the Freedom of Choice Act, federal legislation requiring
abortion remain freely available.'56 Clearly, significant progress could be
made in protecting unborn children and their mothers if electing prolife
public officials were a priority in our national politics.
V. THE IMPACT OF STATE POLITICS ON BUILDING A
CULTURE OF LIFE
The importance of politics in extending legal protections to the unborn
also requires faithful citizens to attend to state politics. National initiatives
to restrict abortion and educate women regarding the nature of abortion and
the unborn are of vital importance, but the majority of abortion restrictions
and regulations are passed on the state level. As many as twelve States
would have enforceable abortion prohibitions on the books if Roe were
overruled. 5 7  Arkansas would prohibit all abortions.'58  Arizona, 59
Michigan, 6 ° Oklahoma,' 6 ' Rhode Island,'62 Texas,'63 West Virginia, 64 and
Wisconsin'65 would allow abortions only to preserve the life of the mother.
Utah would allow abortions to preserve the mother's life or to avoid grave
medical harm, or in cases in which the child was conceived through rape or
incest or suffered genetic deformity.'66  Three states (Louisiana,167North
Dakota, 68 and South Dakota 69) have "trigger" statutes, which were passed
after Roe, with the stated intention of reinstating broad prohibitions on
abortion in the event Roe is reversed. Illinois, 70 Kentucky,' and
visited May 4, 2008). For a discussion of the medical evidence regarding fetal pain, see Teresa
Stanton Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 161 (2003).
155. Abortion Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, S. 350, 110th Congress (2007), GovTrack.us
(database of federal legislation), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-350 (last
visited May 4, 2008)
156. Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 1964, 110th Congress (2007), GovTrack.us (database of
federal legislation), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 110-1964 (last visited May 4,
2008). H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, H.R. Rep. No. 58, 108TH Cong., IST Sess. 2003, 2003 WL
1789189 (Leg.Hist.) at 19.
157. Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of Abortion in the States If Roe v. Wade is
Overruled, 23 Issues in LAW & MEDICINE 3, 4 (Summer 2007).
158. Id. at 7-8.
159. Id. at 6-7.
160. Id. at 21-22.
161. Id. at 30.
162. Id. at 31-32.
163. Id. at 33-34.
164. Id. at 37.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 34-35.
167. Id. at 18-19.
168. Id. at 28-29.
169. Id. at 32-33.
170. Id. at 15-16.
171. Id. at 17-18.
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Missouri'72 have "statements of intent" which, while in and of themselves
would not restore a prohibition, foreshadow legislative efforts to do so in
the absence of Roe. "In 2007, 29 abortion restrictions were enacted in 14
states, capping a rapid rise in the number of new laws since 2000. Between
1985 and 1999, states passed an average of 11 new abortion restrictions
each year.'
73
These state laws, however, are subject to both state and constitutional
requirements. Under current interpretation of the United States
Constitution, government need not provide taxpayer funding for
abortions. 174 While state legislatures may not prohibit all abortions, they
have the authority to require that "a physician inform the woman of the
nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth,
and the 'probable gestational age of the unborn child"' 175 as well as "the
availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus
and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth,
information about child support from the father and a list of agencies which
provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion.' ' 76  Laws
may require that a woman receive this information at least twenty-four
hours before performance of an abortion.'7 7 Abortion providers may be
required to obtain parental consent or provide notice to parents prior to
performing abortions on minors.'78 Clinics may be subjected to reasonable
health and safety regulations. "'
Some state supreme courts, however, have exceeded the United States
Supreme Court in the promotion and protection of abortion. These courts
have interpreted their state constitutions as requiring state taxpayer funding
of abortions 8 ° and access to private hospital facilities by abortion
172. Id. at 23-24.
173. Christine Vestal, Abortion Rates Down, Restrictions Up, Stateline.org (Jan.18, 2008) at
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentld=272870.
174. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (acceptance of Medicaid funding does not require state
to fund nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Equal Protection Clause
does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program to pay expenses incident to
nontherapeutic abortions simply because the state pays expenses incident to childbirth); and
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (upholding municipal regulation that denied
indigent pregnant women nontherapeutic abortions at public hospitals).
175. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889. For an extensive discussion of such legislation, see Teresa
Stanton Collett, Seeking Solomon's Wisdom: Judicial Bypass of Parental Involvement in a
Minor's Abortion Decision, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 513 (2000).
179. "Unfortunately in clinics sometimes there is the cattle herd mentality where a number of
patients are brought in, sent through procedures, and tender love and care is not given to them as
much as in the private office." Women's Med. Ctr. of N. W. Houston v. Archer, 159 F.Supp. 2d
414, 428 (S.D. Tex. 1999) aff'd in part rev'd in part 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (court's
summary of testimony by Dr. Tad Davis).
180. E.g. Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995); New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL
v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998); Women's Health Center of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446
S.E.2d 658, 661 (W. Va. 1993), and Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist., 38
S.W.3d I (Tenn. 2000). "Hawaii, Maryland, New York and Washington voluntarily help low-
income women pay for abortions. Thirteen states are under court orders to fund all or most
No. 1] Advancing the Culture of Life Through Faithful Citizenship 49
providers.'' Laws requiring parental involvement in a minor's decision to
obtain an abortion,'82 as well as requirements that abortions be performed
by physicians,'83 have been struck down as violating state constitutional
provisions. All told, California and nine other states have controlling
judicial opinions that create state constitutional protection of abortion.18
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These rulings suggest the importance of active participation in judicial
elections in the majority of states in which judges are subject to voter
approval.'85 Electing or approving judges who seek to rely upon the text of
the state constitution when interpreting that document, will, in a majority of
cases, insure that citizens and their elected representatives remain in control
of decisions regarding the legality of abortion. Judges who rely upon the
"spirit" of the constitution are more likely to insulate these decisions from
the political process while protecting the practice from restriction or
regulation.
The composition of state legislatures also determines whether the
unborn are afforded legal protection. State legislatures having strong
prolife majorities can attempt to challenge current judicial limits on
abortions." Christine Vestal, States Probe Limits of Abortion Policy, STATELINE.ORG (June 11,
2007), http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld= 136&languageld = l&contentld
=121780.
181. See Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 971-72 (Alaska 1997).
182. See e.g. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577 (Alaska 2007); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. N. J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); In re T.W, 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (state constitutional
subsequently amended).
183. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 375 (Mont. 1999).
184. See e.g. Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska
1997) (defining the scope of the fundamental right to an abortion as "similar to that expressed in
Roe v. Wade"); Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) ("all
women in this state--rich and poor alike--possess a fundamental constitutional fight to choose
whether or not to bear a child."; In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989) ("we have
determined that a woman's fight to decide whether or not to continue her pregnancy constitutes a
fundamental constitutional fight"); Moe v. Secretary ofAdmin. & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387, 398
(Mass. 1981) ("we have accepted the formulation of rights that [Roe] announced as an integral
part of our jurisprudence"; Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 27 (Minn.
1995) ("the right of privacy under the Minnesota Constitution encompasses a woman's right to
decide to terminate her pregnancy"); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 650-54 (Miss.
1998) (creating state constitutional fight to abortion); Armstrong v. State of Mont., 989 P.2d 364,
384 (Mont. 1999) (we hold that Article II, Section 10, protects a woman's right of procreative
autonomy-here, the fight to seek and to obtain a specific lawful medical procedure, a pre-viability
abortion, from a health care provider of her choice"); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925,
934 (N.J. 1982) ("The right to choose whether to have an abortion ... is a fundamental fight of all
pregnant women"); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 15
(Tenn. 2000) ("[tlhe concept of ordered liberty embodied in our constitution requires our finding
that a woman's right to legally terminate her pregnancy is fundamental"); and Beacham v. Leahy,
287 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1972) (finding state constitution protected abortion until "quickening")..For an
extensive analysis of state constitutional law related to abortion, see Paul Benjamin Linton,
ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (Carolina Academic
Press forthcoming).
185. The ability of citizens to knowledgably participate in judicial elections was enhanced by
a recent Supreme Court ruling, which recognized candidate's free speech rights to discuss
contested political issues during judicial campaigns. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765 (2002).
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abortion regulation by passing legislation prohibiting all abortions based
upon the unborn child's immutable characteristics such as race and sex,'86
requiring notification of husbands prior to performance of abortions on
wives,187 or creating civil liability for any individual who performs an
abortion, absent the informed consent of both genetic parents of the fetus.
Following the lead of Louisiana, states can confer juridical personhood on
embryos outside of the mother's body.'88 With sufficient political support,
states can even begin to attempt to reinstate broad prohibitions of
abortion.'89
Some of these initiatives are unlikely to survive judicial review at this
time, but the fact that citizens and their elected representatives keep making
the case to the courts and the American people that government should
protect the lives of the unborn is important. Such laws provide the
opportunity for the Supreme Court to revisit its opinion in Roe, and
evidence citizens' rejection of the Court's resolution of these issues by
judicial fiat. Most importantly, the laws affirm citizens' conviction that
unborn children are worthy of legal protection. For this reason, faithful
citizens have a grave obligation to consider abortion in selecting state
officials, just as they do in selecting the President and members of
Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
This is not the first time in American history that the Supreme Court
has misinterpreted the Constitution and then stubbornly refused to correct
its mistake. It took a civil war to reverse Dred Scott v. Sandford,9' and
fifty-eight years to repudiate the Court's ruling that "separate, but equal"''
met the constitutional command of governmental non-discrimination.' 92
Thousands of faithful citizens shed their blood to free this nation from the
sin of slavery,'93 and their modem counterparts have sacrificed comfort,
186. Cf.L.D. 908, 122 "d Leg. 2005 Maine Sess. (outlawing abortions "when the basis for the
procedure is the projected sexual orientation of the fetus after birth).
187. See e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. La. RS 9-129.
189. South Dakota Abortion Ban to Face Voters, Sioux FALLS ARGUS LEADER (Apr. 25,
2008), available at http://www.argusleader.com/apps/pbcs.dll/articleAID-/20080425/
UPDATES/80425033/l 00 1 /NEWS.
190. 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that Americans of African descendant are incapable of being
citizens under the Constitution).
191. Plessey v. Ferguson, 167 U.S. 537 (1896).
192. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007). I recognize there is a debate
regarding whether the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's command is non-
discrimination or racial equality. My comments in this article are not intended to take a position
on this issue. Rather, at a minimum, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
government not discriminate on the basis of race, and Plessey v. Ferguson was wrongly decided
on that basis.
193. The Civil War remains the bloodiest war this country has been involved in. Union troops
No. 1] Advancing the Culture of Life Through Faithful Citizenship 51
reputation, and personal wealth to end the evil of racial segregation.'94
Similarly, Catholics are called to engage in the arduous struggle to end
constitutional protection of abortion and to extend legal protection to the
unborn.
This struggle will not be easy. Our opponents are well organized and
well funded. They have won the linguistics war. They are often referred to
as "pro-choice," and we are "anti-abortion," or even worse "anti-choice."'1
9 5
They command the cultural heights of the courts, the universities, and most
of the mass media.'96 They use government-funded schools to indoctrinate
our children on the pleasures of sexual exploration and the moral neutrality
of abortion.'97 Some citizens are required to fund abortion by judicial edict
in the guise of state constitutional interpretation.
Yet the simple fact remains that those who support abortion are wrong,
and we are right. A government that refuses to listen to its citizens'
demands that the law protect all human beings from violence is anti-
democratic, "' and in refusing to extend such protection it becomes
fundamentally unjust. 99 As faithful citizens, we must persevere in our
efforts to insure that all human life is protected by law. We must persuade
our families and neighbors to join us in building a culture of life. We must
educate ourselves about the issues and the candidates, and then prayerfully
lost 339,528 men while Confederate troops lost 258,000. George Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln
and the American Regime: Explorations, 35 Val. U. L. Rev. 39 (2000) quoting Richard B. Morris,
ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1961) p. 245.
Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily
pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the
bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword,
as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of the Lord
are true and righteous altogether."
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
194. See McKenzie Webster, Note, The Warren Court's Struggle with the Sit-in Cases and the
Constitutionality of Segregation in Places of Public Accommodations, 17 J.L. & Pol. 373, 395
(2001) and David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 645 (1995).
195. Kenneth L. Woodward, What's In a Name? The New York Times on "Partial-Birth"
Abortion, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 427, 428 (2005).
196. See McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 853 (5th Cir.2004) (Jones, J. concurring) ("That the
Court's constitutional decisionmaking leaves our nation in a position of willful blindness to
evolving knowledge should trouble any dispassionate observer not only about the abortion
decisions, but about a number of other areas in which the Court unhesitatingly steps into the realm
of social policy under the guise of constitutional adjudication."); Neil Gross and Solon Simmons,
The Social and Political Views of American Professors at 74 (2007), available at
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/'-ngross/lounsbery_9-25.pdf (74.7 percent of American professors
believe it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain an abortion for any reason); and
Stanley Rothman and Amy Black, Media and Business Elites: Still in Conflict?, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 72 at 83 (Spr. 2001)(97% of media believe "[i]t is a woman's right to decide whether or
not to have an abortion).
197. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, 68 F. 3d 525 (1st Cir., 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
198. Robert H. Bork, our Judicial Oligarchy in THE END OF DEMOCRACY 10 at 10 (Mitchell
S. Muncy, ed. 1997).
199. Cf Esther 3:7 - 7-10 (telling the story of the Persian king's removal of Jews from the
protection of the law).
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decide who to support. We must communicate our views to elected
officials and hold them accountable for what they do in our name. And, on
those days when it seems to require too much or when change seems
impossible, we must remember St. Paul's admonition, "let us not be weary
in well-doing:for in due season we shall reap, if we faint not."2 '
200. Galatians 6:9 (emphasis added).
